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The Milwaukee Brewers Are Reminding Us There's More Than One Way to Hit

Writer: Brandon Matthews
Brandon Matthews
6 minutes ago
11 min read

What Milwaukee's 2026 postseason run can teach coaches, athletes, and parents about offensive production, strikeouts, and developing better hitters.


Spend enough time around a baseball or softball field, and you'll hear many of the same conversations. A team struggles offensively, and someone inevitably says they need to put the ball in play more. A hitter strikes out with a runner on third, and the discussion turns to how important it is to make contact. Another team wins a close game by bunting, stealing bases, and advancing runners, and we hear about how they played the game the right way.


There's nothing inherently wrong with any of those observations. Strikeouts are outs. Putting the ball in play creates opportunities. Bunting and baserunning can absolutely help a team win games. The problem comes when we begin treating these ideas as universal truths rather than evaluating them within the context of actual offensive production.


The 2026 Milwaukee Brewers provide a fascinating example of why that distinction matters.


During the regular season, Milwaukee finished near the bottom of Major League Baseball in home runs while ranking second in runs scored. Think about that for a moment. One of the least home run-dependent offenses in baseball was also one of its most productive.


It's easy to look at those numbers and assume Milwaukee must have built its offense around traditional small ball. After all, if a team isn't hitting many home runs but is still scoring at a high level, it must be manufacturing runs through contact, speed, and situational execution.


There's certainly some truth to that assessment. Milwaukee has been an outstanding baserunning team, and its ability to create opportunities without depending on the long ball has been a major part of its success. But what makes the Brewers so interesting is that their offense isn't nearly as one-dimensional as the label suggests.


During their four-game sweep of the Los Angeles Dodgers in the National League Championship Series, Milwaukee struck out 45 times in 149 plate appearances, a strikeout rate of 30.2%. They also drew 18 walks and hit seven home runs. Altogether, 47% of their plate appearances ended in one of baseball's three true outcomes: a strikeout, walk, or home run.


The Brewers collected just 32 hits, batted .250 as a team, and still managed to score 21 runs while averaging 5.25 runs per game. They finished the series with a .347 on-base percentage and a .792 OPS.


Perhaps the most fascinating example came in Game 4. Trailing 4–0 against the Dodgers, Milwaukee rallied to win 6–4 despite collecting only five hits. Garrett Mitchell and David Hamilton homered, while Jake Bauers contributed a two-run double and a bases-loaded walk that helped fuel the comeback.


For a team so frequently associated with manufacturing runs and playing small ball, those numbers paint a very different picture. And that's what makes this story worth discussing, especially for those of us involved in developing amateur baseball and softball players.


When Did Making Contact Become the Goal?


Somewhere along the way, I think we've confused putting the ball in play with being a productive hitter.


Spend enough time around youth baseball or softball, and you'll hear parents proudly talk about their child's batting average or how they "hardly ever strike out." And while those accomplishments are worth recognizing, I think we sometimes put too much emphasis on numbers that don't tell the whole story. Batting averages at the youth level can be particularly misleading, especially with the inconsistent scorekeeping we see in travel ball. Routine errors are often recorded as hits, errant throws become doubles, and before long, an athlete's statistics can paint a much different picture than what we're actually seeing on the field.


But even when those numbers are accurate, what are they really telling us? A hitter batting .500 who rarely strikes out might sound impressive, but how much of that success comes from consistently driving the ball versus putting weak contact into play against defenses that struggle to make routine plays? Making contact is an important skill, but making contact and being a productive hitter aren't necessarily the same thing.


A hitter rolls over a weak ground ball, reaches first base because of a defensive mistake, and everyone celebrates the result. A few innings later, another hitter works a good count, lays off a couple of difficult pitches, and eventually strikes out against a pitcher who executes a quality pitch. That athlete returns to the dugout hearing about the importance of putting the ball in play.


But which hitter actually demonstrated better offensive skills? The answer isn't necessarily obvious, and that's the point.


The first hitter may have made a poor swing decision and produced weak contact. The second may have demonstrated excellent zone awareness and a competitive approach before ultimately losing the battle against a pretty good pitcher.


This is one of the reasons I believe we have to be careful about how we evaluate young hitters. The box score tells us what happened, but it doesn't always tell us why it happened or whether the skills demonstrated are likely to produce success in the future.


A ground ball that results in reaching base on an error is still a weakly hit ground ball. A line drive caught by the shortstop is still a well-struck baseball. And a strikeout doesn't automatically mean the hitter had a poor approach, just as putting the ball in play doesn't automatically mean the approach was good.


None of this means results are irrelevant. Baseball is ultimately a game of outcomes, and producing runs is what wins games. But when we're talking about developing players, we have to look beyond what happened during one plate appearance and consider what those performances tell us about the athlete's underlying skills.


Milwaukee's NLCS performance illustrates this distinction well. The Brewers struck out more times than they collected hits, yet they still produced enough offense to sweep the defending World Series champions.


That doesn't make the strikeouts productive. It means the Brewers generated enough value through their other offensive opportunities to overcome them.


Strikeouts Are Bad. But Avoiding Them at All Costs Can Be Worse.


I want to be clear about something because discussions like this can quickly turn into arguments about traditional versus modern hitting philosophies. Strikeouts are not good offensive outcomes. A hitter who consistently swings and misses or struggles to recognize pitches has a problem that needs to be addressed.


Bat-to-ball skill matters. It always has, and it always will. But avoiding strikeouts shouldn't become so important that we sacrifice the very skills that make someone a productive hitter.


Consider a young athlete who is consistently late against faster pitching. A common response is to tell that hitter to shorten their swing, just put the ball in play, or stop trying to hit the ball so hard. Sometimes an adjustment is appropriate, but those instructions don't necessarily address why the athlete is late.


Maybe the hitter isn't preparing early enough. Maybe their swing takes too long to execute. Maybe they're struggling to recognize pitches or make decisions. Maybe the problem is a combination of several factors.


If we respond by simply telling them to make contact, we may encourage an adjustment that produces an occasional weak batted ball without actually improving the skill that was limiting their performance.


The same problem occurs when hitters become so afraid of striking out that they start swinging at pitches they shouldn't. We've all heard someone tell an athlete with two strikes that they need to "protect the plate." While I get the intention, there is a difference between making an appropriate two-strike adjustment and abandoning the strike zone entirely. Chasing pitches outside the zone isn't a good decision just because there are two strikes.


We should absolutely train hitters to compete with two strikes. That includes improving contact ability, understanding how pitchers attack them, and learning to adjust their approach. But those adjustments should increase their chances of producing a successful outcome, not simply make them feel better about avoiding a strikeout.


A strikeout percentage tells us something about an offense, but it doesn't tell us everything.


Small Ball Has a Place. It Just Isn't the Answer to Everything.


I think the same reasoning applies to how we discuss offensive strategy.


There's a tendency in baseball and softball to divide coaches into categories. You're either a small-ball coach who believes in bunting, running, and manufacturing runs, or you're an "analytics" coach who wants everyone swinging for extra-base hits. I've never understood why those approaches have to be mutually exclusive.


A sacrifice bunt can be a valuable strategic decision in the right situation. It can also be a poor decision that reduces a team's opportunity to score. The difference depends on the inning, score, runners, outs, quality of the hitter, opposing pitcher, and several other factors.


It's entirely possible for the same coach to make a smart decision by bunting in one situation and a smart decision by letting the hitter swing away in another. That's understanding the game, your opponent, and your team.


Interestingly enough, Milwaukee incorporated sacrifice bunts into its NLCS offense, including two in Game 1. Milwaukee tied the game with a Brice Turang home run in the fourth inning, then manufactured the winning run using a walk, sacrifice bunt, and RBI single in the fifth.


In the same game, Milwaukee demonstrated that power hitting and small ball aren't competing philosophies. They're different tools that can contribute to winning.


And for coaches working with younger athletes, I think that distinction is especially important. If we spend all our time teaching players to bunt, slap, or simply put the ball in play because those strategies help us win games at younger ages, what happens when those athletes advance to a level where the defense and the pitching are more competitive?


Those skills can still have value. But they shouldn't replace the development of the offensive abilities players will need as the game becomes more difficult.


Are We Developing Hitters or Just Trying to Win Today's Game?


This is where I believe the conversation has the greatest relevance to youth baseball and softball.


Coaches face a difficult balance between trying to win games and developing athletes. Those objectives certainly aren't mutually exclusive, but they don't always lead to the same decisions.


A ten-year-old softball player might be able to reach base consistently by putting weak ground balls in play because opposing defenses struggle to make routine plays. A coach might look at those results and conclude that the athlete is doing exactly what she needs to do. And from the standpoint of winning that particular game, maybe she is.


But is that athlete developing the skills necessary to succeed at fourteen, sixteen, or eighteen, when those ground balls turn into routine outs?


One of the things I emphasize in hitting development is that we're not simply trying to produce better statistics against today's competition. We're trying to develop the skills that allow an athlete to compete against quality pitching, both now and in the future.

That means developing bat speed, improving bat-to-ball ability, learning to make quality swing decisions, and understanding how to approach different counts and situations. All four are connected.


Bat speed gives hitters the physical ability to produce competitive contact. Bat-to-ball skill determines how consistently they can deliver the barrel. Swing decisions influence which pitches they choose to attack. Their plan and approach help them apply those abilities against different pitchers and in different situations.


An athlete can have tremendous bat speed and still struggle because they consistently chase pitches outside the strike zone. Another might recognize pitches extremely well but lack the physical ability to drive the ball. Someone else might have a beautiful swing during batting practice but struggle when pitch velocity, location, and movement become unpredictable.


That's why I don't believe hitting development should revolve around one outcome or one philosophy. We have to develop the complete hitter.


The Numbers Matter, but We Have to Understand What They're Telling Us.


One of the reasons I enjoy studying baseball data is that it challenges assumptions that have existed in the game for generations. But I also think there's a danger in using statistics to support whatever philosophy we already believe.


Someone who dislikes strikeouts can find numbers that demonstrate why making contact matters. Someone who values power can point to offensive production and the importance of extra-base hits. Someone who believes strongly in small ball can find situations where sacrificing an out improves a team's chances of scoring.


All of those arguments can contain some truth. The challenge is understanding how those factors work together rather than isolating one statistic and treating it as the answer.


Take Milwaukee's NLCS numbers. The Brewers struck out in 30.2% of their plate appearances. If I showed you only that number, you might reasonably conclude that they struggled offensively. But what happens when we add their 12.1% walk rate, seven home runs, .347 on-base percentage, and 21 runs scored?


Suddenly, we have a much more complete picture. And even that doesn't tell us everything. We'd still want to examine the quality of their contact, how frequently they chased pitches outside the zone, how well they executed with runners in scoring position, and the quality of the pitching they faced.


That's one of the reasons I've become increasingly interested in evaluating what happens during the at-bat rather than only recording what happens at the end.


Did the hitter swing at a pitch they should have attacked? Did they chase something outside the strike zone? Were they on time? Did they make hard contact? Did they execute the approach they were trying to accomplish?


These are questions that help us identify what an athlete does well or what needs to improve. They also allow us to separate a good process from a fortunate result.


And that's where data becomes particularly valuable in player development. Not simply as a way to rank athletes or produce another statistic, but as a tool for understanding performance, providing relevant feedback, and determining what to train next.


What the Brewers Really Teach Us


The lesson from Milwaukee isn't that strikeouts don't matter, that home runs are overrated, or that small ball is the secret to winning baseball.


The Brewers finished near the bottom of baseball in home runs during the regular season while producing one of the most effective offenses in the league. Then, against a Dodgers team filled with established stars, they swept the National League Championship Series while striking out more than 30% of the time.


They surely didn't win because they struck out 45 times. They won because the other things they did offensively, combined with their pitching and defense, were enough to overcome those strikeouts.


They drew walks. They hit home runs. They took advantage of opportunities. They executed situational plays when necessary. And perhaps most importantly, they demonstrated that a team doesn't have to be limited by the offensive identity other people assign to it.


For me, the takeaway is less about choosing between traditional and modern baseball and more about recognizing what both sides sometimes overlook.


Hitting is a skill, and being a productive hitter requires several different abilities working together.


Making contact matters, but the quality of that contact matters too. Swinging aggressively matters, but only when the hitter is making good decisions about which pitches to attack. Understanding the situation matters, but situational execution shouldn't come at the expense of developing the skills necessary to compete at higher levels.


As coaches, we should want athletes who can do more than simply avoid striking out. We should want athletes who can compete in the box against quality pitching.


As parents, we should be looking beyond batting average and individual game results when evaluating development.


And as athletes, the goal should be to become better equipped to handle the challenges that come with facing better competition.


Because the game gets harder. Pitchers throw faster, their command improves, defenses make fewer mistakes, and the weaknesses that were once hidden by success against younger competition eventually become more obvious.


And from a team perspective, the same principles apply. A productive offense isn't defined by how many home runs it hits, how rarely it strikes out, or how often it plays small ball. It's defined by its ability to consistently create scoring opportunities, execute in different situations, and ultimately produce runs. The best offenses aren't limited to one way of scoring. They have the skills and versatility to find different ways to win.


The Brewers offer a reminder that there's more than one way to build a productive offense. The same is true of developing a productive hitter. The goal shouldn't be to develop a contact hitter, a power hitter, or a small-ball hitter. The goal should be to develop a better hitter.

 
 
 

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